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Experience of the Sacred

Readings in the Phenomenology of Religion

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Editors

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For
ELLEN P. PRESTON
and
BEATRICE R. REYNOLDS
SBT
To
EMILY, DAVID, AND MEGAN
WHC

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PREFACE

Phenomenology of religion denotes a family of related types of inquiry into religion that has developed over the past ninety years. In order to understand and appreciate fully the phenomenology of religion, it is necessary to become acquainted with the range and scope of its activities. Unfortunately, few teaching materials are expressly designed to familiarize students of religion with the wealth of work done and results achieved under the name of phenomenology of religion. To remedy this deficiency and to improve students' access to phenomenology of religion, we have designed a sourcebook that illustrates the range, type, and results of significant twentieth-century investigations in this area. Naturally, we cannot hope to be exhaustive in our selections. Rather our goal is to provide a collection of accessible and representative readings for use in the variety of courses that assign and study such materials.

In selecting the readings for this volume, we included materials regarded as classics in the field, for example, selections from Otto, Scheler, Eliade, and Ricoeur. We also made a special effort to include contemporary selections which, while using the "classics" as touchstones, attempt to forge new ground in a clear, rigorous, and provocative manner, for example, selections from Kristensen, Bynum, Smith, and Westphal. Finally, we have incorporated selections representing phenomenological inquiry into non-Western and prehistoric religious traditions as well as women's religious experience, for example, selections from Sekida, Kitagawa, Arthur, and Christ.

Following the introduction, the remainder of the book is divided into three sections plus a selected bibliography. Each of these sections examines a distinctive mode of phenomenology of religion: essential, historical-typological, and existential-hermeneutical phenomenology through readings illustrating representative materials, for example, accounts of numinous, mystical, and feminist religious experience; forms

of the sacred such as sacred words or sacred places; and themes in the religious life-world such as guilt, hope, and freedom.

Finally, we have demonstrated phenomenology's interdisciplinary use and relevance by including at the end of each section a selection from one of the three principal disciplines employing and contributing to the phenomenology of religion: philosophy (Dupré), anthropology and history of religions (Hultkrantz), and psychology (Pruyser). Our goal throughout the volume has been to provide an anthology of accessible readings that highlight the phenomenology of religion in action.

It is our very great pleasure to acknowledge the assistance of various colleagues in the preparation of this volume. For their critical and constructive comments on our introductory essay and the volume as a whole, we are deeply indebted to Professors Wendell S. Dietrich and John P. Reeder, Jr., of Brown's Department of Religious Studies, Professor Ernest Sosa of Brown's Department of Philosophy, and University Press of New England's anonymous external readers. For their valuable counsel on the volume's reprinted selections, we thank J. Keith Green, a doctoral candidate in Brown's Department of Religious Studies, and Professor Pierre Saint-Amand of Brown's Department of French. For their material help in the logistics of gaining permissions for the reprinted selections, we thank Bonnie Buzzell and Dominique Coulombe of Brown's Rockefeller Library, Gail Tetreault, Academic Office Coordinator of the Department of Religious Studies, and Katherine Langhaugh, undergraduate student assistant to the Department. For her expert word-processing as well as her ability to master and use new computer technologies for the volume's preparation, we thank Jane Simmons, manuscripts secretary of Brown's Department of Religious Studies. For timely support from Brown's Faculty Research Fund, we thank Bryan Shepp, Dean of the Faculty. And for his ongoing general support of our enterprise, we thank Professor John P. Kenney of Reed College's Department of Religion.

Note: In order to simplify the production of this volume, we have eliminated all nonsubstantive footnotes from the reprinted selections. Readers interested in seeing these footnotes may consult the original sources.

S.B.T.
W.H.C., JR.

Experience of the Sacred

INTRODUCTION

The phenomenology of religion is a method of investigation in the academic study of religion, that broad humanistic exploration of religion which has emerged so forcefully in American colleges and universities. As the academic study of religion (or religious studies as it is often called) has consolidated its position within the curricular offerings of American institutions of higher education, two important developments have become clear. 1 First, the academic study of religion has clearly established its independence from the theological study of religion. As more and more departments and programs of religious studies have appeared in state universities and private colleges, they have repeatedly demonstrated their distance from the presuppositions and assumptions associated with seminaries and divinity schools. Second, as the field of religious studies has matured, its course offerings and institutional profile have increasingly become that of a multidisciplinary and humanistic field in the academy. Religious studies has grown from its origins in textual criticism and philological investigation to incorporate the scholarship from historical, literary, philosophical, and social scientific fields of inquiry.

The phenomenological study of religion has contributed to both of these developments. For, as these introductory remarks will more amply demonstrate, phenomenology typically brackets or lays aside metaphysical questions of the real existence of the sacred or the divine. In this way it, too, distances itself from traditional theological inquiry and demonstrates the fruitfulness of an academic approach to the study of religion. Beyond that, as the tradition of the phenomenological analysis of religion has developed, it likewise has incorporated many of the insights and creatively responded to the challenges contained in the findings of other fields of research into religion.

The history of the phenomenology of religion is a complex one. It might be compared to a musical composition that contains three sepa-

rate but related voices: the essential, the historical-typological, and the existential-hermeneutical phenomenology of religion. Schematically, the first voice begins with the publication of Rudolf Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*, which establishes the direction and overall tone of the composition.² Subsequently, in the work of Gerardus van der Leeuw and others, the second voice appears, embellishing upon the first voice yet clearly projecting its own distinctive sound.³ Though receding somewhat into the background, the first voice continues to be heard, and in fact enriches the composition through its interplay with the now dominant second voice. Finally, the third voice, that of the existential phenomenology of religion, enters, and new elements as well as established themes are audible.⁴ In this way the three voices interact with one another, shaping the overall melody and contrapuntally contributing their parts to the resonance and power of the composition as a whole. This phenomenological composition has a certain unfinished character to it. For it not only continues in the present, it also influences such established traditions outside itself as philosophy, history, and psychology as well as such fresh new postmodern modes of criticism as deconstruction and the hermeneutics of gender.

As the musical image suggests, there has been both unity and creativity in the history of the phenomenology of religion. The first use of the phrase "phenomenology of religion" occurred in the 1887 edition of the *Manual of the Science of Religion* by the Dutch scholar, P. D. Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920).⁵ However, Chantepie de la Saussaye conceived of phenomenological analysis as little more than a cataloging of the forms of religion, and his views had little impact on the later development of phenomenology of religion; indeed, the whole section on phenomenology was dropped from the next edition of the *Manual*.

Far more influential for the subsequent history of the phenomenological analysis of religion has been the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911). While there were significant differences between the two, particularly in terms of philosophical style and approach, these German philosophers developed methodological and conceptual insights that reverberated throughout the history of the phenomenological study of religion.

Edmund Husserl's proposals for a philosophical phenomenology amounted to a call for a fresh start in philosophy.⁶ In what has become a motto for the phenomenological movement, Husserl called for a "return to the things themselves." By this phrase Husserl sought to free philosophy from prior dogmatic claims about the nature of knowledge, the world, and ourselves, claims that he felt lacked any ultimate philosophi-

cal justification. Suspicious of theoretical preconceptions that shape and form the experience we are trying to describe before that description has even begun, Husserl sought to develop a philosophy without presuppositions. For example, regarding epistemological inquiry he emphasized that phenomenology must not initially take over informal metaphors, such as "stream of consciousness," nor adopt explicit theoretical constructs, such as the rigid distinction between mind and body, for both of these distort our attempt to describe the experience. Instead, phenomenology must limit itself to descriptions and analyses of experience, inquiries that are open to further revision and improvements.

In his writings, Husserl expanded this insight into a distinctive procedure for examining the nature of human experience. This procedure divides into roughly four major phases: (1) bracketing commonsense beliefs, (2) focusing reflectively on the phenomena of experience, (3) analyzing the traits of these phenomena and their implications, and (4) reporting the results to others for further confirmation or disconfirmation. These phases constituted the core of Husserl's phenomenology, yet they would seem to raise an immediate question: is it not disingenuous of Husserl to decry previous theory builders, only to devise one of his own? At one level, the answer is yes, and Husserl stands in a long line of distinguished thinkers who argue that their predecessors erred and we have to start over again. Yet, at another level, this criticism misunderstands an important point of Husserl's project. For while the characteristics of his procedure do distinguish phenomenology from other philosophical approaches, Husserl contends that phenomenology is not a conceptual imposition upon experience and further that the importance of the procedure is attested by the accuracy and fruitfulness of the method itself. As Robert Solomon has pointed out, for Husserl there is no distinction between method and result in phenomenology. ⁷ And as Husserl himself demonstrates in his own work, this procedure does not remain privileged and unchallenged, but rather constitutes methods continuously questioned and sharpened in the doing of phenomenology.

The first phase of bracketing (also called by Husserl epoché and the phenomenological reduction) involved suspending all commonsense beliefs and judgments about the existence, value, or truth of the objects encountered in experience. Such a step is so thoroughgoing as to include suspending belief in, and philosophical concern with, the existence of the external world. Here again, we find Husserl's concern to see our experience without the presupposition of theory, interpretation, or assumption imposing upon and shaping what we see. The forest we see from the window of our study, for example, is not an interdependent ecosystem of

flora and fauna in competition for survival and threatened by pollution. Rather, it is a vista of variegated colors, shapes, sounds, and scents. Phenomenological analysis does not contradict either the existence of the object or the scientific analysis of the world, but it does bracket them so that we can directly describe what we see.

The first step positions the inquirer for the next which involves viewing the experience reflectively, and seeing how in his experience he is conscious of or related to the objects of his experience. In this second step, for example, the inquirer sees himself (reflectively) in his own act of seeing an object (perceptually); that is, he focuses in a second-order reflective way on his first-order conscious act of perceiving an object. The image is: looking at himself looking at some object; the "looking at object" is ordinary perception, while the "looking at self" is an intellectual act of reflection (discernment, intuition). As Husserl would say, the inquirer becomes the "disinterested spectator" of himself and his conscious experience. This step in turn positions the inquirer to reflect on the intrinsic features of conscious experience, its phenomena and acts.

Husserl always maintained that phenomenology was concerned with the essence and not simply the incidental aspects of experience. For him this third phase of essential examination (he also called it eidetic reduction) sought to analyze the basic traits and types of objects, to figure out the implications and possible interconnections of the experiences under review. Phenomenologists often call this technique "free imaginative variation." It seeks to peel away the extraneous attributes, to lay bare the object that is before one. Thus phenomenological analysis of the experience of friendship, of solving a mathematical theorem, or of the holy produces the essential qualities of that experience. Establishing the relation between the circumference and radius of a circle, for example, tells us something significant about the necessary aspects of all possible circles. We can distinguish between our experience of the circle and all other types of geometric figures. We can reflect imaginatively about other properties and relations pertaining to a circle. When we have completed our analysis of the circle, we know something about the essence of all possible circles. Husserl insists that these qualities are not essential merely because we happen to believe that they are essential. Nor are they essential but only in some confined sphere correlated to our position in an economic class or cultural setting. Rather, Husserl insists that phenomenological analysis produces apodictic knowledge, knowledge not relative to time and place.

The final phase or step involves communicating phenomenological discoveries to a broader audience so that the findings may be verified or

disconfirmed. Husserl called himself a "perpetual beginner" and in this characterization he again signalled his opposition to dogmatic philosophizing. One must always be willing to go back to the beginning, back to the experience itself, to see more directly and analyze more completely. Beyond that, Husserl believed that phenomenological findings, like all scientific claims, must be subject to independent testing and verification. Yet such verification was more than simply checking for syllogistic fallacies or misplaced premises. Indeed, as the phenomenologist, Max Scheler, cautioned, "one must read a phenomenological book with a completely *different attitude*." 8 For Scheler notes that phenomenological discussions often appear indirect and roundabout. They possess these qualities precisely because they are designed to report discoveries in an active rather than inert manner, attempting to lead others to see and verify for themselves what phenomenologists claim to discern. Phenomenological discussions are expressly designed to engage the reader's active intellect; they are complex communicative acts designed to position readers to see the essential nature of phenomena for themselves.

One final observation is appropriate at this point. Husserl maintained that the phenomenological method demonstrated the intentionality of human consciousness. By this phrase Husserl meant that consciousness is always consciousness of something, it always has an object. My experience of anger, of faith, of love always has an object toward which it is directed. This object, Husserl points out, can be a real or material object, such as another person, or it can be an unreal or ideal object such as the Fountain of Youth or a geometric proof. Beyond this, Husserl argues that analysis of the intentional nature of consciousness points to the distinction between the *act* of consciousness (noesis), for example, doubting, worshipping, loving, and the intentional *object* of consciousness (noema). The act of consciousness is clearly related to the intentional object of consciousness; however, they are analytically separable. Thus, on Husserl's account, the phenomenological description of our experience investigates either the act of consciousness, the intentional object of consciousness, or both. This object may or may not exist; however, following the phenomenological reduction, the question of the metaphysical existence of the intentional object of experience, apart from my experiencing of it, is bracketed.

Sometimes called a philosopher of life or a philosopher of the human studies, Wilhelm Dilthey spent his scholarly career exploring the distinctive nature of human experience.⁹ Four themes in Dilthey's work were influential in the later development of the phenomenological analysis of religion. First, much like Husserl, Dilthey emphasized the need to focus

upon human experience and to analyze it without preconceived ideas, reductionist theories, or philosophical commitments. Moreover, though he did not use the specific vocabulary of intentionality, Dilthey joined Husserl in underscoring the purposive nature of human consciousness and experience. Where Husserl noted that consciousness always has an object toward which it is directed, Dilthey made the related observation that the expressions of human consciousness always point beyond themselves to something else.

Second, Dilthey repeatedly emphasized that recognition of the purposive dimensions of human experience entailed that such expressions are meaningful in some fundamental sense. In making a gesture or travelling to a foreign university as a guest professor, it is not the physiology of the gesture nor the task of making travel arrangements that is important for comprehending the experience. Rather it is the tacit significations of the gesture, the ensemble of anticipated opportunities contained in the offer of a new professional circumstance that need to be comprehended. In this way, Dilthey emphasized that there was an inner life to human experience, one that found expression in any number of areas, such as religion and the arts, but also in nonlinguistic and nonverbal aspects of everyday life. Any adequate examination of human experience must account for and make intelligible these dimensions as well.

Third, the methodology appropriate to discern human meanings was what Dilthey called the process of understanding (*Verstehen*). To understand something, whether it be a linguistic text, the performance of a ritual, or the affirmation of a set of doctrinal beliefs, is to interpret it. The process of interpretation, or hermeneutics as it is often called, involves placing the item to be interpreted in an appropriate context of known past references, present lived experiences, and possible future expectations. Thus, for Dilthey, the process of understanding involved the challenge of correctly discerning the meaning of human experience. It involved grasping what people meant in speech and action, discerning the significance of the complex symbolic dimensions of human expression, and finally, entering into the minds of human agents in ways ranging from appreciating their intentions to identifying with and even incorporating their meanings into one's own experience.

Finally, Dilthey often called for the use of typologies in the human studies and is well known for his own typology of human worldviews. In making this point about the usefulness of typologies, Dilthey reminded his readers that such typologies are always generalizations of historically determined human experiences, comparisons, in other words, of concrete social historical reality. Dilthey recognized the epistemological and sci-

entific value of comparative analysis. In the process of gaining knowledge and understanding of our world, we are always engaged in implicit and explicit comparisons. We recognize the color blue in part by comparing it with a spectrum of other colors, and we assess the greetings of a friend as enthusiastic or cool by provisionally comparing them with other such greetings.

Moreover, in scientific inquiry, typologies, comparisons, and generalizations play an important role. For while the results of a specific scientific experiment or historical event can be important, their true significance is established by comparing them with other experiments and events, by placing them within a larger context of similar and dissimilar items. In stressing the utility of comparative typologies, Dilthey insisted that they were primarily heuristic aids, which always needed to be scrupulously checked against the specific data of empirical evidence and historical case study. Typological comparisons, then, were not lifeless apparitions existing apart from the real world. Rather, they reflected concrete historical reality, at the same time that they both embodied something larger and provided a basis for classificatory assessments of similarity and difference.

Any further orientation to the phenomenology of religion requires explicit delineation of its three principal voices. So let us now turn to these, beginning with that earliest voice which so decisively shaped the direction and contours of the field as a whole.

First Voice Essential Phenomenology of Religion

The first voice in the phenomenology of religion is what we call, following Max Scheler, the essential phenomenology of religion. ¹⁰ "Essential" here means a basic concern with the essence or true nature of the religious consciousness of the believing soul—the defining traits of his or her religious apprehensions, emotional states, and motivations for religious activities (what, in a nicely turned phrase, Rudolph Otto calls the distinctively religious "states of the soul").¹¹ This voice in phenomenology of religion is well represented by the researches of Rudolph Otto and Max Scheler, who are often regarded as the founding fathers of this voice, as well as the writing of others, such as Louis Dupré and William Earle, who follow in their path. The thinkers who represent this voice possess both distinctive aims and a reasonably unified method of inquiry, though, of course, as with all scholars, they differ in emphasis and nuance about some issues.

Aims

The aim shared by all essential phenomenologists of religion is to describe and analyze those experiences and concepts uniquely characteristic of religious consciousness. That is, all scholars working within this voice want to clarify for themselves as well as others those apprehensions, emotions, motivations, and activities distinctive to the believing soul who claims to live his or her life in full recognition of a transcendent or sacred dimension of human experience. What, asks the essentialist, defines the consciousness of this sort of person (or community of persons)? In what way does this consciousness differ from nonreligious perspectives on the world? How does the believing soul think, feel, and act, and what does he or she "see" that nonreligious others do not? Questions such as these shape the researches of those working within the essential voice, and they suggest immediately the propriety of employing a method of inquiry that is able to explore sensitively and without bias the committed subjectivity of faithful believers. Before, however, turning to the details of that method, we should ask whether our essentialists share any other aims or goals.

Digging a little deeper into this matter reveals a surprising result. All of our researchers do in fact have other aims, but many of these are not shared. With respect to the essentialists represented in this book, for example, one can discern a number of discrete aims. Otto is interested finally in putting his description of numinous consciousness in service of the broader theological aim of showing that knowledge of the Christian God can be advanced by careful attention to religious experience. Scheler seeks the less theological aim of grounding in a rigorous way a new science of religions. Earle wants to show that at least one type of distinctive religious experience—mystical experience—is continuous with ordinary self-awareness, thus demonstrating to contemporary philosophers that the apparently "irrational" claims of religion have something to contribute to the rational researches into the philosophy of the self. Sekida offers his phenomenology of samadhi as a way of communicating Eastern religious consciousness to the broader audience of the Western world. Christ is concerned to recover the true nature of women's religious consciousness in order to advance the cause of a feminist critique of male-dominated theology and religious thought. And Dupré wants to use essential phenomenology of religion to debunk a myopic vision of philosophy of religion as answerable only to autonomous norms of rationality. So, as it turns out, many essentialists have deeper (and somewhat hidden) agenda governed by normative aims of one sort or another. Being aware of these

deeper aims is important, for it puts us in a position to ask whether they have any bearing on the shared aim of the elucidation of religious consciousness.

What we need to do at this point is to draw a distinction between the phenomenological aim of scholars working within the essential voice, and their broader normative aims since after completing their phenomenological investigations they often go on to use their results in other nonphenomenological programs of inquiry whether theological, philosophical, or social-cultural. Drawing this distinction has two advantages. It permits us to see the relatively unified integrity of essential phenomenological research (in its descriptive aim and method) and it alerts us to a potential problem in this research namely, that its descriptive aim and method might at times be affected by a researcher's larger project. Being thus alerted, we are in a better position to assess critically whether a particular piece of phenomenological research is true to its intrinsic phenomenological aim. Let us now turn to the question of what method unifies our essential phenomenologists.

Method

Besides sharing the descriptive and analytical aim suggested above, researchers within the essential voice also share a relatively unified method of inquiry. This method follows (with some variations) the Husserlian program of adopting the "phenomenological attitude" as a way of gaining insight (intuition) into what makes religious consciousness what it is. Thus, with Husserl, all of our researchers hold that religious consciousness, in its various states and manifestations, is consciousness of something and is structured in a bipolar way involving the correlation of an active "subject" pole (noesis) and an "object" pole (noema). They agree on the importance and propriety of adopting the phenomenological attitude (or epoché) toward their subject-matter the phenomena or states of religious consciousness bracketing or suspending judgment about whether religion is true or valuable, about whether the objects of religious experience are real or not, about whether religious consciousness can be explained in some sort of causal way by the human sciences, and so on. They also agree on the utility of employing "sympathy" or "empathy" in gaining access to the content of religious consciousness temporarily reenacting or reexperiencing within their methodical or tutored consciousness the intentions, experiences, beliefs of the believing soul and then intuitively "observing" and reflectively probing these contents to see what makes them tick, so to speak. They agree that in order to do justice to these contents in conveying them to others, it is

crucially important to provide evocative or "warm" descriptions that aim ultimately at getting others to appreciate (or even reexperience in a sympathetic way for themselves) the "moments" of religious consciousness. 12 And they agree that in order to properly elucidate or clarify the consciousness of the believing soul, it is necessary to identify its essential or defining traits (what makes it distinctively religious).

In gaining further understanding of this method, it may be useful to see it in operation, and this is precisely what is supplied by the authors in the first section of the book. Let us glance at a few of these to see how they understand their method. Since Otto, Scheler, and Earle are especially self-conscious about their method of inquiry, they furnish a particularly perspicuous "lens" on the methodological underpinnings of the essential voice. Each seems adept in clarifying one or another aspect of their shared method, and taken together they provide a rather comprehensive picture of the method in action.

Otto is particularly clear in identifying the basic aim of the essential phenomenology of religion. At the very outset of his inquiry, for example, he indicates that he is concerned to probe and analyze the religious "states of the soul," paying attention to "what is unique in them rather than to what they have in common with other similar states." As he so illuminatingly puts it, "to be rapt in worship is one thing; to be morally uplifted by the contemplation of a good deed is another; and it is not to their common features, but to those elements of emotional content peculiar to the first that we would have attention directed as precisely as possible." This states clearly that Otto's aim is to identify, describe, and analyze the essence of religious consciousness, and he goes on to do just that in his famous characterization of the "most fundamental element in all strong and sincerely felt religious emotion" as "mysterium tremendum et fascinans" (i.e., being simultaneously daunted and fascinated by an awe-inspiring, majestic, and overpowering mystery encountered within religious experience).

Both Scheler and Earle, together with all others working within this voice, clearly agree with this aim. Scheler, for his part, claims that the method of his inquiry into the nature of revelation (understood as divine self-disclosure) involves "the phenomenological scrutiny of essence" of revelation. And Earle, for his part in his study of mystical experience (a particular type of religious consciousness), states his aim as the analysis of his "essence of mystical experience" understood as the "experience of the identity of myself with Absolute Reality." Within this agreed upon aim, our three essentialists then go on to speak of the method necessary for describing and analyzing the various aspects of the consciousness of the believing soul.

Earle is straightforward about the fact that this method is fundamentally Husserlian in orientation, though it must also be noted that both Otto and Scheler were fully aware of the relevance of Husserl's researches for their inquiries. (Husserl, by the way, in a letter to Otto, explicitly approved of Otto's work, praising his *Idea of the Holy* as an original contribution to and a "first beginning" in the essential phenomenology of religion.)¹³ Earle characterizes the method in the following way:

. . . the attempt to reflect radically upon experience as that experience presents itself to the experiencer. It will be then mind reflecting upon itself, without presupposition, in an effort to discern explicitly what the structure and content of that experience is. This reflection from first to last will try to confine itself to experience as it offers itself without presupposing from the start what reality "must" be, what the ego experiencing "must" be, notions drawn from sources external to that experience itself. In a word, that phenomenological reflection does not begin with any logical, biological, physical or philosophical presuppositions. All of that must be put in brackets; the effort will be to reflect upon the experience itself, to see once again what it is rather than to attempt a critique from supposed truths drawn from elsewhere. Phenomenology thus understood is nothing but an attempt to make clear to oneself the phenomenon of any experience whatsoever just as it offers itself to the mind reflecting.

What seems clear from this characterization is that Earle sees the method as involving the adoption of the "phenomenological attitude," implying that the investigator brackets all distorting assumptions about the truth, value, or reality of religion and focuses precisely on the phenomena of religious consciousness as they appear in that consciousness. Furthermore, Earle evidently adopts the technique of imaginative or sympathetic reenactment within his own consciousness of the experience of the believing soul (in his case, the mystic) precisely in order to gain a purchase on "the structure and content of that experience." Thus does Earle link his method and the method of essential phenomenology of religion more generally to those features of Husserlian phenomenology that we earlier identified as "focus on religious phenomena as they appear," "bracketing or epoché," and "sympathetic reexperiencing of phenomena," followed by "intuitive observation of and reflection on reenacted content."

Otto and Scheler, for their part, appear to be entirely in accord with these facets of the phenomenological method. Thus, Otto, for example, though he does not use Husserlian terminology, seeks to describe the elements of the numinous consciousness (another term for "mysterium tremendum et fascinans") as they appear within that consciousness, and he explicitly speaks of the investigator's using "every effort of sympathy and imaginative intuition" and "precise introspection" in so doing. Scheler speaks of the investigator's analyzing the "primal datum" of the