Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of by Neil Feit
By Neil Feit
Philosophers normally feel that the contents of our ideals and different cognitive attitudes are propositions-things that will be real or fake, and their fact values don't differ every now and then, position to put, or individual to individual. Neil Feit argues that this view breaks down within the face of ideals in regards to the self. those are ideals that we exhibit by way of a first-person pronoun. Feit maintains-following David Lewis, Roderick Chisholm, and others-that generally, the contents of our ideals are houses. not like propositions, houses lack absolute fact values that don't range with time, position, or individual. Belief concerning the Self deals a sustained security of the valuables idea of content material, in accordance with which the content material of each cognitive angle is a estate instead of a proposition. the idea is supported with an array of recent arguments, defended from a number of objections, and utilized to a few vital difficulties and puzzles within the philosophy of brain.
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Extra info for Belief about the Self: A Defense of the Property Theory of Content
He needs to locate himself not only in logical space but also in ordinary space. He needs to selfascribe the property of being in aisle ﬁve, ﬂoor six, of Main Library, Stanford; and this is not one of the properties that corresponds to a proposition. (1983a: 138) On Lewis’s modal realism, a proposition is a set of possible worlds (the worlds where the proposition is true) and a property is a set of possible individuals (those that have the property). A property 8. This version of the theory has been defended by Chisholm (1981) and Lewis (1979, 1986: 27–40).
But none of this, by itself, can guarantee that he knows where in the world he is. He needs to locate himself not only in logical space but also in ordinary space. He needs to selfascribe the property of being in aisle ﬁve, ﬂoor six, of Main Library, Stanford; and this is not one of the properties that corresponds to a proposition. (1983a: 138) On Lewis’s modal realism, a proposition is a set of possible worlds (the worlds where the proposition is true) and a property is a set of possible individuals (those that have the property).
Since this set contains certain things in a given world but not others, it does not correspond to a proposition. The content of the information that Lingens lacks, then, is a certain property rather than a proposition. It seems that, to capture the potential contents of thought, we will have to admit what Lewis (1986) calls an abundant conception of properties: “The abundant properties may be as extrinsic, as gruesomely gerrymandered, as miscellaneously disjunctive, as you please. They pay no heed to the qualitative joints, but carve things up every which way” (1986: 59).